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SUMMARY OP THE ARGUMENT
1.

Appellants could not obtain appellate review of the trial court's

additur order except by accepting the additur with reservation of the right to
appeal. Their attempt to appeal the additur order without electing between
additur and a new trial was held by the Utah Supreme Court to be premature. On
the other hand, if Appellants had elected a new trial, the issue of whether the
additur was proper would have been become moot.

Justice demands that

Appellants have an avenue for review of errors of law by the trial court; this appeal
is an appropriate, and indeed is the only available, means to obtain that review.
2.

Terry ignores the fundamental principle that she bore the burden of

persuasion with respect to the amount of her damages, and that the jury was not
persuaded to award greater damages. She fails to distinguish between proof of the
fact of damages and proof of the amount of damages. Since she did not prove the
amount of her general damages by evidence that would compel a finding by
reasonable men and women of general damages in an amount higher than that
awarded by the jury, the trial court abused its discretion in setting aside the jury's
award of $5,000 general damages and substituting its own judgment of general
damages of $20,000,
The evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury's award of $5,000 general
damages as adequate, where it was undisputed that Terry sought medical
attention only three times in the three years following the accident, where her
treating physician diagnosed only a cervical strain, where she took no pain
medication stronger than over-the-counter Tylenol®, and where she continued to
l

work at the same physically demanding job she had held prior to the accident.

ARGUMENT

I.

THE PRESENT APPEAL IS THE ONLY MEANS AVAILABLE TO OBTAIN
APPELLATE REVIEW OF THE ADDITUR ORDER.
Terry never addressed Appellants* principal argument on the issue of

whether a party who has accepted an additur may appeal from the amended
judgment incorporating the additur. That argument asserted that in Utah, the
only means to obtain appellate review of the granting of an additur is to accept the
additur with a reservation of the right to appeal, then appeal from the amended
judgment. That is because (1) until a defendant makes an election between new
trial and additur, an appeal from the order granting an additur would be
premature, as the Supreme Court held in the first appeal in this case; and (2) on
the other hand, to elect a new trial would moot the additur issue, as stated by the
Utah Supreme Court in State v. General Oil Co.. 22 Utah 2d 60, 448 P.2d 718,
719 (1968).
Terry has asserted that "Utah case law has already set out the correct
procedure which defendants should have taken in this c a s e / (Resp. Br. at 6)
citing Haslam v. Paulsen. 389 P.2d 736 (Utah 1964). Unfortunately, Haslam does
not even address the issue of appealability of an order for additur or remittitur.
According to Haslam. an order for a new trial only could be reviewed through an
interlocutory appeal Tin the proper case," which was not defined), or through an
appeal from the final judgment after the new trial is held. However, the dilemma
presented to Appellants in this case was that according to Utah case law dealing
2

directly with additur, an interlocutory appeal would have been rejected as
premature, as Appellants* first appeal was rejected in this case; on the other hand,
the additur issue would have become moot if a new trial had been elected.
Terry's citation of Bodon v. Suhrmann. 8 Utah 2d 42, 327 P.2d 826 (1958)
is wholly unilluminating on this question. Bodon involved the granting of an
additur by the appellate court, not the trial court; in fact, the plaintiff never even
asked the trial court for an additur. Accordingly, the majority opinion in Bodon
does not discuss the procedure for obtaining appellate review of an additur order, *
Terry claims that Appellants have missed "the very heart of the trial court's
order below," which "granted a new trial unless the defendant accepted the
additur." [Resp. Br. at 8-9] Actually, Terry herself misconstrues the court's order.
The court ordered "that the sum of $15,000 be added to the judgment," and then
made that order subject to the condition that "if defendant refuses such additure
[sic], the Court grants a new trial of this matter." Obviously, the primary thrust of

1

As to substantive issues, Bodon Is also distinguishable on its facts. In that case, the
juiy awarded the plaintiff $69 in special damages and only $31 dollars in general damages,
where the plaintiff suffered trichinosis from sausage sold by the defendant. In a split decision,
the Supreme Court held that the damages were inadequate, and ordered an additur of $400. It
should be noted that the same jury awarded another plaintiff $2,000, to which the Supreme
Court refused to grant an additur in a companion opinion. See Schneider v. Suhrmann. 8
Utah 2d 35, 327 P.2d 822 (1958). The dissent in Bodon aptly pointed out the inconsistency of
results in the two cases, that "this selfsame jury could be the exemplary agency which is the
subject of such high complimentation in the opinion in the other suit, and at the same time be
the impassioned, prejudiced and penurious agency which the main opinion here must mean by
its adversion to the verdict as being 'outside the limits of any reasonable appraisal of
damages.'* 327 P.2d at 835.
The examples given in Bodon. which Terry quoted in her brief, are not applicable to this
case. Those examples postulated cases where horses of known value are destroyed.
Obviously, if the amount of damages is not in dispute, a jury verdict that awards damages
other than the undisputed amount is not proper and would be subject to additur or remittitur,
as the case may be. In a case of personal injury, however, where the amount of general
damages is very much in dispute, the jury's verdict is not so easily susceptible of a conclusion
that it is excessive or inadequate.
3

t h e court's order (and, indeed, of Terry's motion for a n additur "or in the
alternative a new trial") was to increase the amount of the judgment, not to grant
a new trial. Terry does not, and cannot in good faith, argue that the additur did
not amend the judgment; the Rules of Appellate Procedure clearly permit appeals
from an amended judgment. See Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Terry's final argument—that by accepting the additur, Appellants waived
their right to appeal—is not well taken. As pointed out in Appellants* principal
brief, waiver only occurs when a party voluntarily relinquishes a known right. In
this case, Appellants' express reservation of the right to appeal defeats any
argument that they voluntarily relinquished their right to appeal. See Robison v.
Garnett. 238 So.2d 58, 59 (La. App. 1970); Busch v. Busch Construction. Inc..
262 N.W.2d 377, 400-01 (Minn. 1977).

H.2

BY SUBSTITUTING ITS OWN JUDGMENT OP THE PROPER AMOUNT OF
GENERAL DAMAGES FOR THE JURY'S JUDGMENT, THE TRIAL COURT
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION.
Terry failed to address Appellants' argument that there were no findings nor

evidence of passion or prejudice on the part of the jury, a s required under Rule
59(a)(5), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to s u p p o r t a finding of inadequate
damages justifying a new trial. Thus, Terry implicitly admits the merit of that
argument.

Instead, her brief focuses on the alternative basis asserted for the

award of a n additur, "insufficiency of the evidence to justify the v e r d i c t /

Rule

2 Point II of Terry's brief argues a point not raised in Appellants' brief, and needs no
response.
4

59(a)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure^ Her argument is essentially that the proof
of her injuries was so compelling and one-sided that no reasonable jury could find
general damages in the amount of only $5,000. However, she forgets that she
always retained the burdens of proof and persuasion on damages, and that the
jury simply was not convinced of general damages in the large sum she was
asking.
Terry fails to distinguish between proof of the fact of damages and proof of
the amount of damages. This failure leads her to conclude that the jury failed to
take into account "proved facts" and that "the verdict clearly indicated a disregard
for competent evidence." [Resp. Br. at 12] The trial court made the same error.
Even if it were conceded, for the sake of argument, that Teny had proved
conclusively that she was injured by the Appellants* negligence, including
aggravation of her degenerative disc condition, and that she would with certainty
have to undergo a disc fusion surgery, a perusal of the record reveals that there
was no evidence at all that could conceivably establish lower or upper limits for
the amount of general damages to be awarded by the jury. It is equally clear that
the jury did award a substantial amount for general damages ($5,000),
representing pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, etc., which was certainly
not a de minimus or nominal award.* The conclusion, therefore, is inescapable

3 Note that this subsection of Rule 59 does not deal expressly with inadequate or
excessive damages, as does subsection (5), relating to damages given under the influence of
passion or prejudice.
4 See, e.g., Henderson v. For-Shor Co.. 757 P.2d 465, 471-72 (Utah App. 1988) ($100
held not to be nominal); Dupuis v. Nelson. 624 P.2d 685 (Utah 1981) ($1,000 in general
damages held not inadequate)

5

that the jury did not disregard the evidence of the fact of general damages. On the
other hand, since there was no evidence of the amount of general damages, it
cannot be concluded that the jury disregarded evidence of the amount of general
damages. Yet the additur order, which added $15,000 to the $5,000 general
damages already awarded by the jury, can only be construed as resulting from an
erroneous and unjustified conclusion that the jury disregarded the evidence on
the amount of general damages. In so doing, the trial court plainly abused its
discretion, because the lack of evidence on the amount of general damages
certainly does not "compel a finding that reasonable men and women would, of
necessity," have found a greater amount. See Jensen v. Eakins. 575 P.2d 179,
180 (Utah 1978) (emphasis added).
Acting as though this Court were the jury itself, Terry goes to great lengths
to recite the evidence that her physicians testified that she was injured as a result
of the accident, that she herself testified that the injury caused her pain and
suffering and loss of enjoyment of life, and that her husband and employer
testified to adverse changes in her life. [Resp. Br. at 15-22] Furthermore, Terry
speaks of the evidence on the possibility of disc fusion surgery as though it were a
fait accompli (although it is apparent from her brief that she has not yet had the
surgery, even though it is now almost one year from the date of the trial).
However, she fails to note that much of the testimony on possible future surgery
related to the potential costs of the surgery and its consequences, which are
special damages, and that the trial court did not see fit to award any additional
amount for special damages.
6

With regard to general damages, the trial court stated that a[t]he jurors [sic]
assessment of general damages did not take into account the pain and suffering of
the plaintiff to date, nor that attributable to the surgery, as testified to by Dr.
Smithes The trial court utterly failed to explain what the jury's award of $5,000
for general damages represented, if not pain and suffering. The jury was not
asked to apportion general damages as between past and future pain and
suffering. Thus there is no basis for the court's conclusion that the jury award of
general damages did not take into account either past or future pain and
suffering; the jury verdict conclusively establishes that the jury did indeed take
Terry's pain and suffering into account, only it was not as sympathetic or
generous as the trial judge.
Theoretically, an additur accomplishes the purpose of rendering a judgment
within the range of damages justified by the evidence, where the jury's verdict was
clearly outside of that range. In this case, the court's addition of $15,000 to the
$5,000 jury verdict for general damages would imply that the evidence
established, as a matter of law, that Terry's pain and suffering had a minimum
value of $20,000.

There is simply no basis for that conclusion.

5

Based on

Regarding the possible disc surgeiy. Dr. Smith did not testify that it would produce
greater pain and suffering for Teny. Rather, he testified on direct examination that in his
opinion "she would benefit from it," "she will improve/ "I would expect that she could be
helped/ "a range of motion would be improved in spite of the fusion, that her headaches would
be Improved because of the fusion, and that some of the areas of disablement she might be
able to get back to on a, quote, limited basis/ [Tr. 602-03] He also testified on crossexamination that disc fusion surgeries are "way over 95 percent of success rate. I think
surgical treatment of bad necks is one of the luminescent joys of a spinal surgeon . . . . that's
one reason why I can very comfortably say, 'I think you'd get better/ Because the probabilities
are very high that she would get some improvement.... I don't recall any [patients] that have
been worsened [by the surgery]." [Tr. 644] Thus Dr. Smith's testimony supports the
conclusion that Plaintiff would likely have substantially less pain and suffering as a result of
the surgeiy, rather than increased pain and suffering.
7

competent, undisputed evidence that Terry only sought medical attention three
times in the three years following the accident, that she dramatically increased
her medical expenses and visits to medical personnel just prior to the trial, that
she continued to work at the same job, and that she only took over-the-counter
Tylenol® for her pain, the jury's verdict is well supported, and simply indicates
that Terry had failed to carry her burden of proof of damages in a greater amount.

CONCLUSION
If the trial court's interference with the jury's verdict is permitted to stand in
this case, it would make a mockery of the basic principles of our system of trial by
jury, as elaborated in Appellants' principal brief: that Plaintiff always bears the
burden of persuasion on the amount of damages; that there is no set formula for
awarding general damages in a personal injury case;6 that the amount of general
damages is exclusively for the jury to determine;7 and that the trial court may not
interfere with the jury's determination as to the amount of damages unless the
verdict clearly indicates a disregard of the evidence or the influence of passion or
prejudiced The verdict plainly shows that the jury did not disregard the evidence
on general damages, but awarded a substantial sum that is wholly compatible
with the evidence it chose to believe.9 Thus the trial court went "beyond the limits

6

See Cruz v. Montova. 660 P.2d 723, 236 (Utah 1983).

7 See Batty v. Mitchell. 575 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah 1978).
8 See, e.g., Battv v. Mitchell. 575 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah 1978); Paul v. Kirkendall. 1
Utah 2d 1, 261 P.2d 670 (1953).
9 See Onveabor v. Pro Roofing. Inc.. 787 P.2d 525, 530 (Utah App. 1990).
8

of reasonability,"10 and thereby abused its discretion in awarding an additur. This
Court should reverse that decision and reinstate the original judgment based on
the jury's verdict.
Respectfully submitted this w

day of May, 1993.

U S WEST Communications, Inc.

Jensen, Attorney

Mailing Certificate
I hereby certify that on this
of May, 1993, I caused two copies of
the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellants to be mailed by United States mail, postage
prepaid, to the following:
R. Phil Ivie
Jeffery C. Peatross
IVIE & YOUNG
48 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 672
Provo, Utah 84603

10 State v. Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992).
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